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Comparative	  Law	  and	  the	  ‘Ius	  Gentium’	  
Se-shauna Wheatle* 
A. The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Ius	  Gentium	  	  Legal	  principles	  are	  often	  invoked	  in	  adjudication	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  foreign	  law	  and	  occupy	  an	  important	  space	  in	  the	  discourse	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  cosmopolitan	  norms.	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  taps	  into	  cosmopolitan	  theory	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	   law	   in	   adjudication	   is	   part	   of	   the	   expression	   of	   ‘laws	   common	   to	   all	  mankind’,	   identifying	  universal	   legal	  principles	  as	  part	  of	   this	   ius	  gentium.1	  The	  principles	   that	   contribute	   to	   the	   ius	   gentium	   are	   those	   that	   ‘emerge	   from	  consensus	  in	  the	  legal	  world’,	  consensus	  that	  is	  largely	  indicated	  by	  ‘convergent	  currents	   of	   foreign	   statutes,	   foreign	   constitutional	   provisions,	   and	   foreign	  precedents’.2	  These	  principles	  are	   therefore	   identified	  by	   their	  characteristic	  of	  commonality	   or	   universality.3	   Waldron	   draws	   on	   Gaius’s	   idea	   that	   countries	  governed	   by	   laws	   ‘use	   partly	   their	   own	   laws	   and	   partly	   laws	   common	   to	   all	  mankind	   to	   govern	   themselves’4	   and	   identifies	   the	   ius	   gentium	   as	   a	   body	   of	  positive	   law	   that	   particularly	   applies	   to	   relations	   between	   the	   individual	   and	  government	  and	  also	  sometimes	  to	  relations	  between	  private	  individuals.5	  Thus,	  as	   a	   substantive	  matter,	   the	   concept	   of	   ius	   gentium	   has	   special	   relevance	   and	  connection	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   constitutional	   norms,	   and	   the	   use	   of	  constitutional	  and	  human	  rights	  principles.	  As	  a	  methodological	  matter,	   the	   ius	  
gentium	   theory	   is	   developed	   largely	   from	   comparative	   engagement	   between	  state	  legal	  institutions,	  including	  courts.	  The	  cosmopolitan	  viewpoint	  is	  indeed	  useful	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  use	  of	  constitutional	  and	  human	  rights	  principles	  by	  courts	  insofar	  as	  the	  commonality	  of	   language	   and	   methodology	   surrounding	   the	   use	   of	   such	   principles	   is	  connected	  to	  elemental	  human	  and	  institutional	  instincts.	  This	  paper	  notes	  that	  there	   are	   common	   threads	   that	   permeate	   transnational	   judicial	   use	   of	  constitutional	  principles,	  particularly	  a	  theme	  of	  order	  and	  stability.	  However,	  a	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broader	  analysis	  of	  transnational	  judicial	  engagement	  presents	  a	  picture	  which	  is	  more	  nuanced	  than	  that	  presented	  by	  Waldron.	  This	  analysis	  is	  critical	  in	  light	  of	  the	   significant	   role	   played	   by	   judicial	   references	   to	   foreign	   law	   in	   the	  identification	   of	   the	   ius	   gentium.	   Judicial	   citations	   of	   foreign	   law	   are	   not	   only	  crucial	   to	   understanding	   the	   development	   of	   the	   ius	   gentium,	   they	   are	   also	  central	   to	   Waldron’s	   motivation	   for	   expounding	   the	   ius	   gentium	   theory.	   The	  theory	  is	  used	  to	  justify	  and	  defend	  judicial	  references	  to	  foreign	  law.	  It	  seeks	  to	  accomplish	  this	  justificatory	  goal	  by	  maintaining	  that	  as	  lawyers,	  we	  are	  engaged	  in	   a	   common	   legal	   enterprise	   and	   are	   seeking	   to	   apply	   common	   principles	   to	  local	   settings,	   and	   that	   in	   looking	   to	   foreign	   laws,	   judges	   learn	  more	  about	   the	  application	  of	   those	   common	  principles.	   It	   becomes	   crucial	   then	   to	   interrogate	  the	  extent	  of	  commonality	  of	  the	  enterprise.	  This	  paper	  maintains	  that	  we	  must	  pay	  sufficient	  regard	  to	  the	  influence	  of	   historical	   and	   cultural	   divisions	   that	   compartmentalize	   the	   jurisdictions	  engaged	   in	   transnational	   judicial	   dialogue.	   This	   compartmentalization	   and	   the	  divergence	   that	   results	   from	   it	   require	   that	   arguments	   for	   the	   ius	   gentium	   be	  more	  cautious	  and	  nuanced.	  Two	  alternative	  proposals	  are	   therefore	  advanced	  for	  adding	  more	  complexity	  to	  the	  ius	  gentium	  theory.	  The	  first	  proposal	  is	  that	  a	  
ius	  gentium	   is	  emerging	  but	   it	   is	  not	  a	  current	  reality.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  to	  the	  extent	   that	   a	   ius	   gentium	   does	   exist,	   it	   is	   more	   accurately	   characterised	   as	   a	  convergence	  of	  methodology	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  substantive	  norms.	  	  	  
B. Principles	  that	  Travel	  Well	  	  	   The	  central	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  principles	  is	  that	  they	  are	  norms	  which	  may	  be	  applied	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  weight.6	   It	   is	  partly	   this	   flexibility	   that	  permits	   principles	   to	   function	   as	   tools	   of	   transnational	   legal	   analysis.	   In	  particular,	  principles	  often	   serve	  as	  a	   connection	   to	   foreign	   law	  when	   they	  are	  applied	   as	   representative	  of	   a	  basic	   societal	   need	   for	  order.	  When	  used	   in	   this	  way,	   the	   principles	   ‘travel	   well’,	   to	   borrow	   an	   analogy	   employed	   by	   William	  Twining.	  The	  notion	  of	  travelling	  well	  speaks	  to	  the	  transferability	  of	  a	  concept	  across	   different	   jurisdictional,	   cultural	   and	   other	   contexts.	   In	   this	   sense,	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principles	   that	   are	   evoked	   as	   expressions	   of	   basic	   needs	   or	   inclinations	   are	  perfect	   candidates	   for	   norms	   that	   have	   achieved	   consensus	   in	   the	   legal	  world.	  The	  concept	  of	  principles	  that	  travel	  well	  is	  supported	  by	  way	  of	  illustration	  by	  cases	   that	   raise	   questions	   regarding	   the	   validity	   of	   legislation	   passed	   and	  institutions	   constituted	   in	   a	   manner	   and	   form	   that	   contradict	   the	   formal	  requirements	  of	   the	  Constitution.	  This	   is	   the	  scenario	  presented	  by	  cases	  that	   I	  will	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘legal	   vacuum’	   cases-­‐	   cases	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   threat	   of	   a	  substantial	   gap	   in	   the	   normative	   order	   of	   a	   jurisdiction.	   The	   designation	   ‘legal	  vacuum’	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  descriptive	  of	  the	  circumstances	  actually	  in	  existence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  case.	  Rather,	  the	  term	  is	  applied	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  spectre	  of	  such	  a	  vacuum	  arising	  depending	  on	  the	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  response	  to	  the	  lack	   of	   constitutional	   conformity.	   This	   includes	   post-­‐revolution	   circumstances	  which	  arose	   in	  Cyprus,	  Grenada	  and	  Fiji,	   and	   the	   interesting	  case	  of	   the	   failure	  the	   Canadian	   province	   of	   Manitoba	   to	   obey	   constitutional	   requirements	   for	  bilingual	  publication	  of	  laws.	  	  Legal	  vacuum	  cases	  represent	  an	  understanding	  of	  principles	  such	  as	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  necessity	  that	  extend	  beyond	  local	  and	  cultural	  boundaries.	  Such	  cases	  not	  only	  use	  principles	  that	  have	  been	  accepted	  throughout	  constitutional	  democracies,	   they	   also	   reflect	   the	   elemental	   human,	   institutional,	   and	   state	  inclinations	   towards	   order	   and	   stability.	   Those	   inclinations	   are	   so	   basic,	  particularly	  in	  legal	  vacuum	  cases,	  that	  they	  would	  generate	  broad-­‐scale	  support	  across	  jurisdictions.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  an	  interesting	  connection	  between	  the	  legal	  vacuum	  cases	  and	  Waldron’s	  defence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  law:	  the	  idea	  of	  moral	  necessity.	   Waldron’s	   argument	   is	   that	   if	   we	   suppose	   that	   there	   is	   something	  useful	   to	   learn	   from	   foreign	   law,	   particularly	   about	   basic	   rights,	   then	   it	   is	   a	  necessity	   to	  consult	  such	   foreign	  material	   in	  order	   to	  arrive	  at	  more	   intelligent	  and	   accurate	   decision-­‐making	   about	   rights.	   The	   consultation	   of	   foreign	   law,	   in	  this	   sense,	   contributes	   to	   the	   accuracy	   and	   fairness	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	  exercise.7	   This	   moral	   necessity	   ‘does	   not	   evaporate	   with	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  democratic	   basis	   for	   giving	   weight	   to	   foreign	   precedents	   or	   ius	   gentium	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principles.’8	   In	   a	   similar	   sense,	   in	   emergencies	   (circumstances	   in	  which	  where	  there	  is	  an	  urgent	  threat	  to	  the	  legal	  order),9	  when	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  a	  decision	  be	  made	   for	   the	   common	   good,	   and	   there	   is	   no	   opportunity	   to	   use	   the	   proper	  democratic	   procedures,	   the	   decision	   can	   nonetheless	   be	   defended	   on	   the	  grounds	  of	  the	  moral	  necessity	  of	  the	  circumstances.	  	  There	  is	  evidence	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  consensus	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  stability	  and	  continuity	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  in	  cases	  from	  jurisdictions	  as	  diverse	  as	  Fiji,	   Canada	   and	   Grenada.	   This	   elemental	   need	   for	   order	   has	   long	   been	  recognized	   through	   constitutional	   provision	   for	   the	   exercise	   of	   executive	   and	  legislative	   powers	   during	   times	   of	   emergency	   and	   in	   justifications	   for	  extraordinary	   state	   action	   taken	   in	   exceptional	   situations.	   Thus,	   John	   Ferejohn	  and	  Pascale	  Pasquino	  maintain	  that	  emergency	  powers	  ‘have	  long	  been	  thought	  to	   be	   a	   vital	   and,	   perhaps,	   even	   an	   essential	   component	   of	   a	   liberal	  constitutional-­‐	  that	  is,	  a	  rights-­‐protecting-­‐	  government.’10	  The	  aim	  of	  such	  power	  is	  ‘fundamentally	  conservative’-­‐	  it	  is	  to	  resolve	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  system	  ‘in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  legal/constitutional	  system	  is	  restored	  to	  its	  previous	  state.’11	  The	  necessity	   of	   providing	   for	   exceptional	   or	   emergency	   situations	   is	   well-­‐acknowledged,	  despite	  disagreements	  on	  the	  ultimate	  factual	  resolutions	  of	  such	  situations.12	  	  The	  well-­‐known	  Reference	  re	  Manitoba	  Language	  Rights	  case	  decided	  by	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   is	   pivotal	   in	   this	   discussion,	   partly	   because	   the	  court	  made	  explicit	   the	  elemental	  needs	   identified	   in	   this	  paper.	  Section	  133	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act	  1867	  and	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Manitoba	  Act	  1870	  required	  that	  all	  the	   Records	   and	   Journals	   of	   the	   Houses	   of	   the	   Parliament	   of	   Canada	   and	   of	   the	  Legislatures	  of	  Quebec	  and	  Manitoba,	  and	  the	  Acts	  of	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Canada	  and	  of	   the	   Legislatures	   of	   Quebec	   and	   Manitoba,	   be	   printed	   and	   published	   in	   both	  English	   and	   French.	   The	   Manitoba	   Act	   1870	   is	   entrenched	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Constitution	  of	  Canada	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  52(2)(b)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act	  1982.	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Yet,	   in	   1890,	   the	   Manitoba	   Legislature	   enacted	   the	   Official	   Language	   Act	   1890	  (Manitoba),	  providing	  that	  Manitoba	  statutes	  need	  only	  be	  enacted	  and	  published	  in	   English.	   Subsequently,	   Manitoba	   ceased	   publication	   of	   French	   versions	   of	   its	  records,	  journals	  and	  legislation.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  seek	  a	  comprehensive	  ruling	  on	  the	  legal	   status	   of	   English-­‐only	   laws,	   the	   federal	   government	   sent	   a	   reference	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   of	  Canada,	   asking	   the	  Court	   to	  determine,	   inter	   alia,	  whether	   the	  language	  requirements	  of	  section	  133	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act	  1867	  and	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Manitoba	  Act	  1870	  were	  mandatory,	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  Manitoba	  legislation	  that	  were	  not	  printed	  and	  published	   in	  both	  English	  and	  French	  were	   invalid	  by	  reason	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Manitoba	  Act	  1870.	  The	  court	  answered	  both	  questions	  in	  the	  affirmative,	  but	  on	  the	  second	  question,	  it	  clarified	  that	   ‘the	  invalid	  current	  Acts	  of	  the	  Legislature	  will	  be	  deemed	  temporarily	  valid	  for	  the	  minimum	  period	  necessary	   for	   their	   translation,	   re-­‐enactment,	   printing	   and	   publication.’13	   Thus,	  despite	   the	   clear	   unconstitutionality,	   the	   Court	   nonetheless	   declared	   that	   the	  laws	  should	  be	  observed	  as	  temporarily	  valid	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  legal	  vacuum	  in	  the	  province.	  	  
The	   continuity	   of	   positive	   law	   was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   decision	   of	   the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  Manitoba	  case.	  This	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  court’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  a	  ‘fundamental	  postulate’	  of	  the	  constitution	  meant	  that	  the	  court	  had	  a	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  base	  its	  decision	  to	  declare	   the	   temporary	   validity	   of	   the	  Manitoba	   legislation.	   As	   the	   court	   put	   it,	  ‘the	   rule	   of	   law	   requires	   the	   creation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   an	   actual	   order	   of	  positive	   laws	   to	   govern	   society.’14	   The	  maintenance	   of	   the	   positive	   legal	   order	  was	  perceived	  as	  essential	  to	  ‘avoiding	  a	  legal	  vacuum	  in	  Manitoba	  and	  ensuring	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.’15	  Consequently,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  a	  ‘declaration	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  Manitoba	  are	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  legal	  force	  or	  effect	  would	  deprive	  Manitoba	  of	   its	   legal	  order	  and	  cause	  a	   transgression	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law.’16	  This	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led	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   ‘otherwise	   invalid	   acts	   may	   be	   recognized	   as	  temporarily	  valid	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  normative	  order	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.’17	  	  
The	   nature	   of	   continuity	   which	   was	   discussed	   in	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	  judgment	  was	  quite	  elemental.	  It	  was	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  for	  humans	  in	  any	  society	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  norms	  to	  guide	  behaviour	  and	  contribute	  to	  a	  system	  of	  social	  control.	  It	  is,	  in	  a	  word,	  elementary	  to	  the	  very	  existence	  and	  survival	  of	  the	  society.	  In	  societies	  governed	  by	  law,	  legal	  norms	  are	  particularly	  essential	  in	  maintaining	  social	  control	  and	  an	  ordered	  society.	  A	  state	  as	  a	  legal	  community	  cannot	   exist	   or	   survive	   without	   the	   existence	   of	   laws	   to	   condition	   inter-­‐individual	   relationships	   and	   the	   relationships	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	  state.18	   This	   sentiment	   was	   made	   explicit	   in	   the	  Manitoba	   case,	   the	   Canadian	  Supreme	   Court	   stating	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   recognizes	   that	   ‘law	   and	   order	   are	  indispensable	   elements	   of	   civilized	   life.’19	   The	   elemental	   nature	   of	   the	   concern	  for	  securing	  normative	  order	   through	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  placed	   the	   issue	   faced	  by	  the	  court	  in	  a	  global	  context	  and	  indicated	  that	  it	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  provincial	   or	  national	  perspective.	  This	   globalized	  perspective	  was	   reflected	   in	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	   references	   to	   judicial	  decisions	   in	  Cyprus	  and	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  unconstitutional	   statutes.	   In	   those	   foreign	   judgments,	   the	   courts	  invoked	   the	   doctrine	   of	   state	   necessity	   to	   validate	   otherwise	   unconstitutional	  legislation.	   The	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	   approvingly	   commented	   that	   ‘[t]he	  cases	  on	   the	  necessity	  doctrine	  …	  point	   to	   the	  same	  conclusion:	   the	  courts	  will	  recognize	  unconstitutional	   enactments	   as	   valid	  where	   a	   failure	   to	  do	   so	  would	  lead	  to	  legal	  chaos	  and	  thus	  violate	  the	  constitutional	  requirement	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.’20	  Since	  the	  preservation	  of	  a	  legal	  order	  would	  be	  essential	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  any	  state,	  this	  internationalized	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  Manitoba	  case	  and	  helped	  to	  justify	  the	  incorporation	  of	  foreign	  judicial	  decisions	  into	  the	  court’s	  reasoning.	  	  An	   internationalized	   issue	   is	  part	  of	   the	  crux	  of	   the	  response	  to	   ‘localist’	  objectors	  to	  judicial	  comparativism	  in	  constitutional	  cases.	  The	  localist	  objection	  posits	   that	   constitutional	   adjudication	   in	   any	   jurisdiction	  must	   be	   grounded	   in	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the	   constitutional	   culture	   or	   constitutional	   identity	   of	   the	  nation	   in	   question.21	  The	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   national	   locale	   is	   central	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  requirements	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  foreign	  law	  is	  accordingly	  irrelevant.	  If	  an	  issue	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  global	  issue,	  the	  argument	  from	  constitutional	  locale	  recedes	   in	   importance.	  However,	   in	   legal	  vacuum	  cases	  where	  the	  preservation	  of	   normative	   order	   becomes	   a	   central	   factor,	   the	   issue	   extends	   beyond	   local	  boundaries,	  the	  localist	  objection	  loses	  force	  and	  there	  is	  a	  stronger	  case	  for	  the	  relevance	  of	  foreign	  law.	  
The	  necessity	  of	  preserving	  law	  and	  order,	  which	  was	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
Manitoba	  decision,	  has	  influenced	  judges	  in	  post-­‐revolution	  jurisdictions	  to	  rely	  on	  similar	   legal	  principles	  and	  to	  engage	   in	  reasoning	  similar	   to	   that	  employed	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Manitoba	  Language	  Rights.	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Mitchell	  
v	  DPP,	  the	  facts	  of	  which	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  set	  out	  in	  some	  detail.	  The	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Mitchell	  case	  arose	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  revolution	  in	  Grenada,	  a	  usually	  peaceful	   ‘small	   island	   in	   the	   Eastern	   Caribbean’.22	   A	   coup	   d'état	  was	   staged	   in	  March	  1979	  by	  the	  New	  Jewel	  Movement,	  the	  opposition	  party	  to	  the	  then	  ruling	  Grenada	  United	  Labour	  Party.	  The	  ‘bloodless	  revolution’	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Government	  (PRG)	  in	  1979,	  led	  by	  Maurice	  Bishop,	  who	  assumed	  the	  position	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Grenada.	  The	  PRG	  suspended	  the	  Constitution	   of	   Grenada	   1973	   and	   promulgated	   a	   set	   of	   People’s	   Laws;	   the	  existing	  local	  courts	  were	  abolished	  as	  were	  appeals	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council.	  A	  new	  Supreme	  Court	  consisting	  of	  a	  High	  Court	  and	  a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  created	  by	  People’s	  Laws	  Nos.	  4	  and	  14.	  The	  PRG	  was	  overthrown	  in	  October	  1983,	  when	  Maurice	  Bishop	  and	  some	  of	  his	  Ministers	  were	  murdered.	  Following	  the	  murders,	  a	  Revolutionary	  Military	  Council	  assumed	  power,	  which	  lasted	  for	  approximately	  one	  week,	  whereupon	  their	  reign	  was	  terminated	  when	  the	  island	  was	  invaded	  by	  forces	  from	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  along	  with	  forces	   from	   some	   Caribbean	   states.	   The	   Governor	   General	   of	   the	   country	   then	  issued	   a	   proclamation	   declaring	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   and	   declaring	   that	   he	  would	  exercise	  executive	  authority	  until	  a	  government	  was	  elected	  pursuant	  to	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the	   Constitution.	   The	   declaration	   also	   stated	   that	   ‘existing	   laws’	   (including	  People’s	   Laws	   Nos.	   4,	   14,	   and	   84,	   which	   established	   the	   new	   judicial	   system)	  would	   continue	   in	   force.	   Constitutional	   government	   returned	   when	   the	  Constitution	   of	   Grenada	   Order	   1984	   was	   published,	   which	   provided	   that	   the	  Constitution	   of	   1973	   was	   in	   force	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   some	   specified	  provisions,	  and	  a	  new	  Parliament	  was	  elected	  in	  December	  of	  1984.	  The	  first	  Act	  passed	  by	  this	  new	  parliament	  in	  1985	  confirmed	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  laws	  passed	  during	  the	  PRG	  rule	  when	  the	  Constitution	  had	  been	  suspended.	  	  
The	   appellants	   in	   the	   case	   were	   charged	   with	   the	   murders	   of	   Maurice	  Bishop	  and	  other	  ministers	  of	  the	  PRG	  and	  were	  awaiting	  trial	  in	  the	  High	  Court.	  The	   indictment	   against	   them	   was	   filed	   in	   September	   1984,	   before	   the	  resumption	   of	   government	   under	   the	   Constitution.	   They	   applied	   to	   the	   High	  Court	  challenging	  the	  High	  Court’s	  competence	  to	  hear	  the	  charge,	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  court	  was	  established	  by	  the	  PRG	  under	  People’s	  Laws	  Nos.	  4	  and	  14	  and	  that	   since	   that	  government	  was	   invalid,	   those	   laws	  were	   invalid	  and	  hence	   the	  High	  Court	   itself	   as	   it	  was	   then	  constituted	  was	   invalid.	  Nedd	  CJ,	   sitting	  on	   the	  bench	  of	   the	  High	  Court,	  dismissed	   the	  application,	  holding	   that	  while	   the	  PRG	  was	   not	   the	   de	   jure	   government,	   the	   laws	   passed	   by	   it	   validly	   established	   the	  Supreme	   Court.23	   The	   appellants	   then	   appealed	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   of	  Grenada.	  The	  issues	  raised	  on	  appeal	  included	  whether	  the	  PRG	  was	  the	  de	  facto	  government	  of	  Grenada,	  whether	   the	  PRG	  achieved	  de	   jure	   status	  before	   it	  was	  overthrown,	  whether	  People’s	  Laws	  Nos.	  4	  and	  14	  were	  valid,	  and	  whether	  the	  court	  had	  jurisdiction	  to	  hear	  the	  appeal	  before	  it.	  	  	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   held	   that	   there	   was	   insufficient	  evidence	   before	   it	   to	   decide	   whether	   the	   PRG	   had	   achieved	   de	   jure	   status.	  However,	   the	  Court	  also	  held	   that	  People’s	  Laws	  Nos.	  4	  and	  14	  were	  validated	  under	  the	  law	  of	  necessity,	  and	  therefore	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (including	  the	  Court	  of	   Appeal	   itself)	  was	   validly	   constituted.24	  Haynes	   P.,	   indicated	   that	   one	   of	   the	  maxims	  from	  which	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity	  is	  derived	  is	  that	  stated	  by	  Bacon:	  ‘that	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   state	   is	   the	   supreme	   law	   (salus	   populi	   suprema	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lex)’.25	  	  Based	  on	  this	  understanding,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  listed	  five	   conditions	   for	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   necessity,	   the	   first	   among	  these	  being	  that	  an	   imperative	  necessity	  must	  arise	  because	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  exceptional	   circumstances	   not	   provided	   for	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   for	   immediate	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  protect	  or	  preserve	  some	  vital	  function	  of	  the	  State.	  Simeon	  McIntosh,	   a	   respected	   Caribbean	   legal	   academic,	   criticized	   the	   Court’s	  application	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   necessity	   to	   the	   case	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	  circumstances	  before	  the	  court	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  ‘emergency’	  in	  the	  meaning	  required	   by	   the	   necessity	   doctrine	   because	   the	   doctrine	   only	   applies	   to	  unconstitutional	   acts	   performed	   by	   a	   constitutional	   state.26	   He	   also	   based	   his	  criticism	   on	   the	   argument	   that	   ‘it	   is	   only	   a	   court	   that	   is	   itself	   already	   validly	  constituted	   that	   would	   have	   jurisdiction’	   in	   the	   case.27	   McIntosh’s	   latter	  criticism-­‐	  regarding	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  court	  –	  certainly	  indicates	  a	  logical	  flaw	  in	  the	  decision.	  However,	  a	  court	  before	  which	  this	  issue	  is	  raised	  must	  decide;	  that	  is	   a	   critical	  distinction	  between	   judicial	  practice	   and	   legal	   theory.	  As	   the	  Court	  recognized,	   it	   was	   imperative	   for	   it	   to	   give	   a	   reasoned	   decision	   that	   would	  provide	  guidance	  and	  certainty	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disorder.	  	   The	  commonality	  of	  concern	  for	  maintenance	  of	  law	  and	  order	  was	  again	  on	  display	   in	   the	  use	   of	   the	  doctrine	   of	   necessity	   in	   successive	   cases	   in	   Fiji,	   in	  which	   the	   courts	   referred	   to	   the	  Mitchell	   judgment	   and	   adopted	   most	   of	   the	  conditions	  of	  the	  necessity	  test	  enumerated	  by	  the	  Grenadian	  Court	  of	  Appeal.28	  The	  Parliament	  of	  Fiji	  was	  subject	  to	  an	  armed	  invasion	  and	  coup	  in	  May	  2000,	  the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   other	   ministers	   being	   taken	   hostage.	   The	   President	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	  appointed	  a	  free	  minister	  to	  act	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  and	  under	   section	  59	   (2)	   of	   the	  Constitution,	   prorogued	  Parliament	   for	   six	   (6)	  months.	   The	   acting	   Prime	   Minister	   then	   resigned.	   The	   military	   commander	  assumed	  executive	   authority	   as	   head	  of	   an	   interim	  military	   government,	  made	  decrees	   suspending	   parts	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   decrees	   that	   holders	   of	  constitutional	  offices	  and	  organs	  of	  government,	  including	  courts	  (other	  than	  the	  
                                                            
25  Ibid, 76. 
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27  Ibid, 37. 
28  Prasad v Republic of Fiji [2001] 2 LRC 743; Qarase v Bainimarama [2008] FJHC 241; Michael 
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Supreme	   Court)	   should	   continue	   to	   operate.	   He	   installed	   an	   interim	   civilian	  government	  and	  an	  interim	  President	  without	  first	  consulting	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  (who	   had	   by	   that	   time	   been	   released),	   in	   accordance	   with	   section	   90	   of	   the	  Constitution.	   	   The	   applicant,	   a	   farmer	   who	   claimed	   to	   have	   lost	   rights	   by	   the	  suspension	   of	   his	   constitutional	   rights,	   issued	   an	   originating	   summons	   in	   the	  High	  Court,	  seeking	  a	  ruling	  that	   the	  1997	  Constitution	  was	  still	   in	   force	  as	   the	  supreme	   law.	   	  Gates	   J.	   in	   the	  High	  Court	  held	   that	   the	  declaration	  of	   a	   state	  of	  emergency	  was	  valid	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity,	  but	  that	  necessity	  could	  not	  be	   invoked	   to	   justify	   purported	   abrogation	   of	   the	   Constitution	   by	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   new	   extra-­‐constitutional	   regime.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   interim	  civilian	   government	   was	   not	   legally	   established	   and	   the	   Constitution	   of	   1997	  remained	  in	  force,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  claim	  succeeded	  on	  most	  points.	   The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   dismissed	   the	   government’s	   appeal	   –	   employing	  different	   reasoning	   to	   arrive	   at	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   interim	   civilian	  government	   was	   invalid	   –	   but	   upheld	   the	   legality	   of	   many	   of	   the	   military	  commander’s	  acts	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity.	  Again,	  as	  in	  the	  Grenadian	  and	  Canadian	   cases,	   the	   primary	   concern	   was	   with	   what	   actions	   and	   steps	   were	  necessary	  for	  the	  ‘ordinary	  orderly	  running	  of	  the	  State’.29	  Despite	  the	  distinction	  between	   the	   results	   of	  Mitchell	   and	   Prasad,	   there	   was	   a	   common	   motivating	  factor	  of	  preventing	  anarchy.	  In	  fact,	   though	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   in	  Prasad	  held	  that	   the	   Constitution	   remained	   the	   valid	   supreme	   law,	   its	   ruling	   ensured	   that	  there	  was	  no	  legal	  vacuum	  by	  upholding	  the	  legality	  of	  many	  acts	  of	  the	  military	  commander	  and	  by	  permitting	  the	  Acting	  President,	  who	  had	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  military,	  to	  remain	  in	  office	  for	  a	  limited	  period.	  Again,	  therefore,	  the	  court’s	  decision	  ensured	  the	  maintenance	  of	  law	  and	  order,	  despite	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  formal	  requirements	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  	  	   In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  reader	  may	  also	  have	  noticed	  strong	  institutional	  undertones.	   One	   aspect	   of	   the	   institutional	   implications	   relates	   to	   the	  institutional	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  court	  in	  ruling	  on	  the	  issues	  before	  it.	  However,	  the	  primary	   institutional	   concern	   is	   that	   of	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   validity	   of	  essential	  state	  organs.	  This	  was	  central	  to	  the	  Mitchell	  case,	  where	  the	  validity	  of	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the	   court	   itself	   was	   being	   challenged,	   prompting	   Peterkin	   JA	   to	   refer	   to	   ‘the	  impossible	   situation	   which	   could	   and	   would	   arise	   without	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  Court	   in	  Grenada’.30	  Likewise,	   in	  explaining	  why	   it	  was	  necessary	   to	  deem	  that	  the	   Acts	   of	   the	   Legislature	   of	   Manitoba	   were	   temporarily	   valid,	   one	   of	   the	  concerns	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  that	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  province.	  In	  holding	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  demanded	  the	  declaration	  of	  temporary	  validity,	  the	  court	  summarized	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	   institutions	   of	   government	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Manitoba	   if	   the	   Acts	   of	   the	  province	  were	  invalidated	  with	  immediate	  effect:	  The	  situation	  of	  the	  various	  institutions	  of	  provincial	  government	  would	  be	   as	   follows:	   the	   courts,	   administrative	   tribunals,	   public	   officials,	  municipal	   corporations,	   school	   boards,	   professional	   governing	   bodies,	  and	  all	   other	  bodies	   created	  by	   law,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   they	  derive	   their	  existence	  from	  or	  purport	  to	  exercise	  powers	  conferred	  by	  Manitoba	  laws	  enacted	   since	   1890	   in	   English	   only,	   would	   be	   acting	   without	   legal	  authority.31	  	  The	  validity	  of	  the	  Legislative	  Assembly	  of	  Manitoba	  would	  itself	  have	  been	  open	  to	   doubt	   if	   the	   Court	   had	   not	   proceeded	   to	   grant	   temporary	   validity	   to	   the	  English	  only	  laws.	  While	  the	  Manitoba	  Legislature	  was	  validly	  established	  by	  the	  Manitoba	   Act	   1870,	   subsequent	   to	   1890,	   English	   only	   laws	   had	   been	   passed	  relating	  to	  the	  franchise	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Legislature.	  This	  raised	  the	  prospect	  that	  not	  only	  would	  a	  legal	  vacuum	  exist,	  but	  the	  Legislature	  would	  lack	  the	   institutional	   legality	   to	   fill	   this	   vacuum.32	   For	   these	   institutional	   reasons,	  along	   with	   the	   potential	   impact	   on	   the	   substantive	   law	   of	   the	   rights	   and	  obligations	  arising	  under	  unilingual	  Acts	  passed	  after	  1890,	  the	  court	  concluded	  that	  ‘declaring	  the	  Acts	  of	  the	  Legislature	  of	  Manitoba	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  force	  or	  effect	  would,	  without	  more,	   undermine	   the	  principle	  of	   the	   rule	  of	   law’	  Hence,	  the	   court	   invoked	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   not	  merely	   to	   preserve	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  positive	   laws,	   but	   also	   to	   ensure	   the	  maintenance	   of	   institutional	   authority	   to	  generate	  and	  implement	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  state.	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The	   constitutional	   principles	   called	   upon	   by	   the	   courts	   in	   these	   cases	  (necessity	  and	  the	  rule	  of	   law)	  fit	  neatly	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  cosmopolitan	  norms	  because	  these	  principles,	  as	  used	  in	  the	  cases	  above,	  are	  concepts	  that	  provide	  a	  direct	   link	   to	   basic	   human	   and	   societal	   needs.	   Thus,	   they	   are	   principles	   and	  concepts	   that	   ‘travel	   well’	   because	   they	   are	   so	   intimately	   connected	   to	   the	  elemental	   needs	   of	   society.33	   What	   the	   courts	   responded	   to	   in	   the	   cases	  discussed	   above	   was	   not	   simply	   analysis	   of	   national	   laws	   and	   national	  circumstances;	   they	   responded	   to	   universally	   recognized	   necessities.	   Thus,	  whatever	  the	  disputes	  among	  academics	  and	  judges	  about	  the	  exact	  contours	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  it	  renders	  lawful	  or	  valid	  acts	  which	  are	   ‘necessary	  to	  peace	  and	  good	  order’.34	  Similarly,	  despite	   the	  ongoing	  and	   complex	   debates	   regarding	   the	   content	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   it	   is	   universally	  accepted	  that	  it	  requires,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  the	  existence	  of	  laws.35	  This	  element	  of	  universality	   in	   turn	   facilitates	  and	   justifies	  references	   to	   foreign	   law.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   we	   do	   see	   constitutional	   principles	   functioning	   in	   a	   way	   that	  suggests	   there	   is	   some	   merit	   in	   Waldron’s	   ius	   gentium	   analysis.	   However,	   as	  discussed	   below,	   there	   is	   much	   more	   to	   the	   use	   of	   constitutional	   and	   human	  rights	  principles,	  some	  of	  which	  would	  not	  be	  classified	  as	  principles	  that	  travel	  well.	  Further,	  there	  are	  other	  inter-­‐jurisdictional	  dynamics	  that	  must	  inform	  our	  analysis	   in	   order	   to	   give	   a	   more	   accurate	   account	   of	   the	   implications	   of	  transnational	  judicial	  discourse.	  
C. Legal	  Decision-­‐making?	  	   The	   use	   of	   principles	   in	   legal	   vacuum	   cases	   appear	   to	   be	   attempts	   to	  identify	   and	   glean	   the	   core	   elements	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   constitution	   by	  ‘dig[ging]	   down	   to	   the	   level	   of	   constitutional	   theory’36	   to	   apply	   the	   core	   of	  foundational	  principles	  of	   the	  constitution.	  So,	   for	   instance,	   if	   in	  a	   case	   such	  as	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34  Texas v White (1868) 7 Wallace 700, 733; Head, above n 28, 268. 
35  Paul Craig, 'Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework' 
[1997] PL 467; Alison L Young, ‘The Rule of Law in the United Kingdom: Formal or 
Substantive?’ (2012) 6 ICLJ 259; Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010). 
36  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 
539, 584. 
Manitoba	  Language	  Rights,	  a	  principle	  is	  used	  to	  ensure	  the	  maintenance	  of	  laws	  in	  a	  jurisdiction,	  this	  is	  a	  core	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  universally	  accepted,	  that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   requires	   that	   there	  must	   exist	   a	   positive	   order	   of	   laws.	   So	  while	  there	  may	  be	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  court’s	  resolution	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	   case,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   there	   would	   be	   debate	   surrounding	   the	   court’s	  statement	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   demands	   that	   there	   must	   be	   laws.	   Similarly,	  despite	   its	   potential	   for	   substantial	   effect	   on	   the	   legal,	   political,	   and	   social	  structures	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity	  has	  generally	  been	  recognized	  as	  one	  of	  ancient	  vintage	  and,	  in	  fact,	  was	  relied	  upon	  by	  an	  English	  court	  as	  early	  as	  1672.37	   Indeed,	   Glanville	   Williams	   identified	   twelve	   maxims	   justifying	   the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity38	  and	  he	  justified	  its	  place	  in	  the	  law,	  noting	  that:	  	  ‘The	  law’	  is	  not	  a	  body	  of	  systematised	  rules	  enacted	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  fixed	  for	   all	   time.	   Judges	   have	   always	   exercised	   the	   power	   of	   developing	   the	  law,	  and	  this	  is	  now	  recognized	  to	  be	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  their	  function.	  ‘The	  law’,	  in	  a	  word,	  includes	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity;	  the	  defence	  of	  necessity	  is	  an	  implied	  exception	  to	  particular	  rules	  of	  law.39	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  Grenadian	  CA’s	  judgment	  in	  Mitchell,	  though	  McIntosh	  criticised	   the	   court’s	   ruling,	   his	   critique	  was	   based	   on	   his	   view	   that	   the	   Court	  ‘misconstrued	  the	  doctrine’40	  and	  not	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  doctrine	  itself	  was	  an	  illegitimate	  tool	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.	  Importantly,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  Mark	   Stavsky,	   commenting	   on	   the	  use	   of	   the	  doctrine	   of	   necessity	   in	   Pakistan,	  that	  ‘if	  narrowly	  and	  carefully	  applied,	  the	  doctrine	  constitutes	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law’.41	   Indeed,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  stated	   in	   the	  Manitoba	  case	  that	  ‘the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity	  is	  not	  used	  in	  these	  cases	  to	  support	  some	  law	  which	  is	  above	  the	  Constitution;	  it	   is,	   instead,	  used	  to	  ensure	  the	  unwritten	  but	  inherent	   principle	   of	   rule	   of	   law	   which	   must	   provide	   the	   foundation	   of	   any	  constitution.’42	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It	   is	   also	   crucial	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   in	   legal	   vacuum	   cases,	   the	   court	  plays	  a	  secondary	  role	  in	  ascribing	  validity	  to	  legislation	  under	  an	  understanding	  that	   it	   is	   ‘necessary’	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   secondary	   role	   of	   the	   court	   is	   key	   to	  assessment	  of	  the	  institutional	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  court’s	  decision-­‐making	  in	  such	  cases.43	   Therefore,	   in	   these	   cases,	   the	   central	   factual	   circumstance	   is	   that	   the	  legislature	  and/or	  executive	  of	   the	   jurisdiction	  promulgated	  acts	   that	  would,	   in	  ordinary	   circumstances,	   be	   invalid;	   the	   primary	   legal	   actors	   are	   the	   elected	  branches	  of	  state.	  It	  is	  only	  subsequently	  that	  the	  court	  becomes	  involved,	  when	  asked	  to	  legally	  acknowledge	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  exceptional	  acts	  and	  to	  confer	  partial	   (that	   is,	   temporary)	   or	   complete	   validity	   on	   the	   prior	   legislative	   or	  executive	  acts.	  	  Despite	   the	  universally	  accepted	  necessity	  of	  providing	   for	  emergencies,	  there	  remain	  doctrinal	  and	  institutional	  difficulties	  regarding	  courts’	  approach	  to	  such	  circumstances.	  One	  persistent	  question	  provoked	  by	  the	  legal	  vacuum	  cases	  is	   whether	   the	   decision-­‐making	   that	   occurs	   in	   such	   cases	   is	   actually	  appropriately	   denoted	   ‘judging’	   or	   ‘legal	   decision-­‐making’	   or	   more	   accurately	  characterised	   as	   decisions	   primarily	   motivated	   by	   practicality	   or	   political	  (necessity).44	  Considering	  the	  Manitoba	  case,	  while	  the	  court	  determined	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  was	  an	  applicable	  principle	  in	  the	  case,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  could	  have	  led	  the	   court	   in	   opposite	   directions.	   First,	   it	   could	   have	   been	   applied	   as	   a	  requirement	   that	   the	   court	   and	   other	   institutions	   obey	   the	   text	   of	   the	  Constitution,	  which	  prescribed	  that,	   in	  order	  to	  be	  valid,	  the	  laws	  enacted	  must	  be	   bilingual.	   The	   result	   of	   such	   an	   application	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	  would	   be	   the	  immediate	  nullity	  of	   the	  unilingual	   laws.	  A	  conflicting	  application	  of	   the	  rule	  of	  law	  –the	  one	  chosen	  by	  the	  court-­‐	  was	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  requires	  an	  order	  of	  positive	  laws.	  As	  shown	  above,	  the	  result	  of	  this	  application	  was	  the	  (temporary)	  validity	   of	   the	   laws.	   The	  question	   therefore	   arises	  what	   factors	   resulted	   in	   the	  court’s	  choice	  of	  the	  latter	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  is	  certainly	  plausible	  to	  propose	  that	   the	  choice	  between	  the	  two	  applications	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  was	  motivated	  by	  political	   or	  practical	   considerations	   that	   are	  outside	   the	   scope	  of	  legal	   norms.	   A	   decision-­‐making	   process	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   such	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considerations	   challenges	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   court’s	   judgment	   as	   a	   legal	  judgment.	  	  	  
D. Divergence	  and	  Dilution	  
 Despite	   the	   common	   threads	   of	   transnational	   law	   that	   unite	   the	   legal	  vacuum	   cases,	   empirical	   and	   critical	   analysis	   of	   a	   wider	   array	   of	   judicial	  decisions	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   influence	   of	   history	   creates	   regional	   and	  national	   distinctions	   that	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   While	   some	   underlying	  instincts	   may	   be	   common	   to	   the	   point	   of	   being	   universal,	   the	   transnational	  judicial	  development	  of	  principles	  diverge	  along	  fault	  lines	  influenced	  by	  history,	  institutional	  development,	  and	  pedagogical	  and	  educational	  patterns.	  	  
Methodology	  Thus,	  while	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  strain	  of	  cosmopolitanism,	  it	  is	  limited	  by	  historical,	   institutional	  and	  doctrinal	  factors	  that	  must	  be	  appreciated	  in	  our	  understanding	   of	   the	   methodology	   and	   implications	   of	   the	   judicial	   use	   of	  principles.	   Thus,	   unsurprisingly,	   discourse	   occurs	   heavily	  within	   constitutional	  networks,	  which	   share	   a	   common	   language	   and/or	   a	   common	   legal	   heritage.45	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   there	   is	  no	   exchange	  between	  networks,	   but	   it	   does	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  much	  more	  discourse	  and	  legal	  exchange	  on	  the	  intra-­‐network	  level	  than	  the	  inter-­‐network	  level,	  and	  this	  must	  affect	  the	  content	  and	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  recognized	  by	  respective	  judicial	  institutions.	  	  A	   further	   nuance	   that	   must	   influence	   our	   analysis	   is	   the	   dimension	   of	  discursive	   power	   which	   not	   only	   contributes	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   regional	   and	  sub-­‐regional	  pockets	  of	  transnational	  discourse,	  but	  also	  significantly	  affects	  the	  
content	   of	   norms	   and	   the	   relative	  normative	   influence	   of	   jurisdictions.	  We	  must	  squarely	   confront	   the	   questions	   whether	   if	   there	   are	   laws	   common	   to	   all	  mankind,	  who	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  these	  laws,	  and	  what	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  different	  countries?	  While	  Waldron	  cautions	  us	  not	   to	   make	   the	   mistake	   of	   thinking	   the	   issue	   is	   ‘global	   uniformity’,	   he	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nonetheless	  posits	  that	   ‘to	  a	  large	  extent,	  we	  treat	  law	  more	  like	  a	  science-­‐	  as	  a	  
global	   enterprise	   of	   which	   we	   partake	   -­‐than	   like	   a	   national	   costume	   or	   some	  aspect	  of	   the	   culture	  we	  would	  put	  on	   show	   to	  establish	  our	  distinctiveness.’46	  The	   central	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘global	   enterprise	   of	   which	   we	   partake’	   must	   be	  interrogated	  by	  examination	  of	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	  actual	  judicial	  citations	  in	   the	   context	   of	   history	   and	   geopolitical	   dynamics.	   Acknowledging	   that	   a	  substantial	   avenue	   through	   which	   we	   partake	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   law	   is	  through	   judicial	   reasoning	  and	  decision-­‐making,	   and	   that	   judicial	   references	   to	  foreign	   law	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   ius	   gentium	   theory,	   we	   must	   take	  account	   of	   the	   imbalances	   in	   the	   transjudicial	   discourse.	   The	   imbalances	   are	  evidenced	  by	  empirical	  data.	  Empirical	   evidence	   of	   citations	   of	   foreign	   precedent	   by	   the	   Australian	  High	  Court	  between	  2000-­‐2008,	   shows	   that	  UK	  and	  US	  authorities	   account	   for	  over	  80	  percent	  of	  citations,	  with	  Canada	  being	   the	   third	  most	   frequently	  cited	  and	  New	  Zealand	  the	  fourth.47	  Canada	  tells	  a	  similar	  tale,	  with	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  UK	   comprising	   over	   88	   percent	   of	   the	   citations	   to	   foreign	   precedents	   in	  constitutional	  cases	  decided	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  between	  1982	  and	  2010.	  Australia	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  earned	  third	  and	  fourth	  places,	   respectively.48	   Part	   of	   accounting	   for	   these	   figures	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	  tendency	   to	   cite	   jurisdictions	   that	   are	   former	  members	   of	   the	   British	   Empire,	  share	  a	  common	  law	  tradition	  or	  speak	  a	  common	  language.	  Thus,	  this	  is	  partly	  a	  function	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   judicial	   dialogue	   tends	   to	   occur	   within	   regions	   and	  within	  the	  same	  legal	  (and	  linguistic)	  family.	  The	  legal	  family	  ties	  are	  particularly	  heightened	  in	  the	  common	  law.49	  There	  is	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  common	  law	  as	  a	  unified	   whole,	   which	   is	   reflected	   in	   judges	   speaking	   to	   the	   desirability	   of	  convergence	  and	  even	  unity	  within	  the	  common	  law,	  particularly	  within	  regional	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groups	  of	  common	  law	  jurisdictions.	  Lord	  Bridge	  stated	  in	  Bennett	  v	  Horseferry	  
Road	  Magistrates’	  Court:	  	  Whatever	   differences	   there	  may	   be	   between	   the	   legal	   systems	   of	   South	  Africa,	  the	  United	  States,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  this	  country,	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  principles	  to	  which	  they	  seek	  to	  give	  effect	  stem	  from	  common	  roots.50	  The	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	   the	  Privy	  Council	  has	  also	  encouraged	  regional	  unity	  within	   common	   law	   jurisdictions,	   stating	   approvingly	   in	   an	   appeal	   from	   the	  Caribbean	  state	  of	  Belize	  that	  the	  Judicial	  Committee’s	  decision	  ‘will	  bring	  Belize	  into	  line	  with	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries	  of	  the	  Caribbean’.51	  	  Waldron	  does	   acknowledge	   the	   legal	   family	   critique	   of	   claims	   of	   a	   legal	  consensus	   and	   universalism,	   but	   issues	   the	   rejoinder	   that	   a	   ‘self-­‐referential	  starting	  point	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  projection	  unto	  an	  unfamiliar	  environment’.	   He	   encourages	   us	   to	   accept	   that	   ius	   gentium	   is	   still	   valuable	  despite	  that	  it	  develops	  unevenly,	  ‘in	  fits	  and	  starts’.	  The	  difficulty	  that	  remains,	  even	   accepting	   this	   encouragement,	   is	   that	   as	   compartmentalized	   as	   the	  discourse	  is,	  it	  is	  more	  accurate	  to	  perceive	  ius	  gentium	  as	  emerging	  but	  not	  truly	  existing	   as	   a	   current	   system.	   There	   is	   as	   yet	   no	   global	   system	   and	   it	   is	   more	  accurate	  to	  see	  a	  global	  system	  as	  a	  possibility	  in	  the	  future	  but	  not	  a	  reality	  at	  present.	  	  A	  further	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  that	  should	  be	  undertaken	  is	  to	  account	  for	  the	  fact	   that	   even	   legal	   families,	   there	   are	   imbalances	   in	   transnational	   citations.	  Within	  the	  common	  law	  system,	  some	  former	  members	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  are	  referenced	   with	   remarkably	   higher	   frequency	   than	   others.	   During	   the	   period	  1982-­‐2010,	   the	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	   made	   only	   five	   references	   to	   Indian	  case	  law	  and	  4	  to	  Caribbean	  case	  law,	  compared	  with	  81	  references	  to	  Australian	  and	  32	  to	  New	  Zealand	  case	  law.52	  In	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court,	  from	  2008-­‐2008,	  there	   no	   references	   to	   the	   Commonwealth	   Caribbean	   and	   only	   15	   Indian	  references	  compared	  with	  317	  for	  Canada	  and	  even	  36	  for	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	   Rights.53	   The	   limited	   reciprocity	   in	   cross-­‐referencing	   between	  jurisdictions	   also	   undermines	   claims	   that	   there	   is	   true	   transnational	   dialogue.	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For	  example,	   it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  while	   the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  South	  African	  Constitutional	  Court	  cite	  each	  other,	  the	  latter	  cites	  the	  former	  approximately	  three	  hundred	  times	  more	  often	  than	  vice	  versa.54	  	  There	   are	   several	   practical	   factors	   that	   likely	   contribute	   to	   these	  imbalances.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  apparent	  factors	  is	  the	  relative	  volume	  of	  case	  law	  generated	   by	   comparator	   jurisdictions;	   for	   instance,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  Canada	  produces	  more	  constitutional	  and	  human	  rights	  rulings,	  in	  terms	  of	  sheer	  numbers,	   than	   for	   instance,	   the	   Caribbean	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   But	   that	   cannot	   be	  sole	  explanation	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court,	  for	  instance,	  also	  generates	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  case	  law,55	  yet	  the	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  cited	  with	  much	  less	  frequency	  than	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court.	  A	  further	  practical	  consideration	  is	  that	  of	   ‘documentary	  access’	   to	  case	   law	  emanating	  from	  some	  jurisdictions.	   Other	   practical	   factors	   include	   institutional	   affiliation	   with	  educational	   facilities	   in	   the	   more	   developed	   states56	   and	   functional	   resource-­‐based	   considerations	   that	   encourage	   states	   to	   consult	   the	   judicial	   record	   of	  jurisdictions	  that	  have	  already	  addressed	  difficult	  issues	  in	  hard	  cases.	  Beyond	   practical	   considerations,	   there	   are	   broader	   influence-­‐based	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  may	  be	  more	  pedagogical	  value	  in	  referring	  to	  judgments	  of	  older	  democracies,	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  some	  jurisdictions	  are	  more	  ‘developed’	  and	  therefore	  have	  greater	  reputational	  currency.	  Accordingly,	  some	   of	   the	   power	   imbalance	   is	   a	   function	   of	   relative	   global	   influence	   that	  extends	  beyond	  law,	  and	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  geopolitical	   imbalances	  that	  occur	  in	  normative	  legal	  systems	  that	  involve	  the	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  jurisdictions	  in	  a	  global	   setting.57	   Thus,	   there	   is	   not	   only	   a	   problem	   of	   documentary	   access	   in	  relation	  to	  various	  jurisdictions,	  but	  also	  documentary	  influence.	  	  There	  is	  some	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  citations	  by	  Waldron.	   He	   briefly	   discusses	   citations	   among	   Commonwealth	   jurisdictions,	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pointing	   to	   Commonwealth	   jurisdictions	   citing	   each	   other,	   but	   makes	   three	  analytical	  errors.	  First,	  in	  speaking	  of	  ‘the	  Commonwealth’,	  he	  falls	  into	  a	  familiar	  pattern	   of	   limiting	   the	   Commonwealth	   almost	   exclusively	   to	   Australia,	   New	  Zealand	  and	  Canada.	  Of	  course,	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Nations	  is	  a	  much	  broader,	  more	   diverse	   group,	  with	   a	   host	   of	   potentially	   constitutionally	   significant	   case	  law.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   sometimes	   there	   is	   less	   to	   be	   gained	   from	   referring	   to	  developing	  nations	  that	  have	  not	  confronted	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  facing	  more	  developed	  countries	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  commercial	  or	  contract	  law,58	  but	  this	  does	  not	   account	   for	   or	   justify	   neglect	   of	   literature	   from	   developing	   countries	   on	  constitutional	   issues.	   Secondly,	   commenting	   on	   the	   citation	   by	   other	  Commonwealth	   countries	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	  Waldron	  maintains	   that	   ‘the	  citations	   go	   in	   both	   directions’.	   However,	   he	   does	   not	   adequately	   address	   the	  critiques	   regarding	   the	   frequency	   of	   citations	   by	   the	   UK	   courts	   of	   other	  Commonwealth	  countries,	  and	  regarding	  which	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries	  are	  most	  frequently	  cited.	  In	  short,	  he	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  address	  the	  question	  of	   the	   extent	   of	   reciprocity	   in	   citations.	   Thirdly,	   Waldron	   does	   not	   raise	   the	  question	  whether	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  citations	  by	  UK	  courts	  to	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries	  are	  actually	   references	   to	   the	   judgments	  of	   the	  Privy	  Council	   and	   therefore	   indicative	   of	   citations	   to	   a	   Bench	   that	   substantially	  overlaps	  with	  members	  of	  the	  UK	  House	  of	  Lords.59	  	  The	  discussion	  regarding	  which	  jurisdictions	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  dialogue	  and	   the	   extent	   and	   character	   of	   their	   engagement	   affects	   at	   least	   three	   issues.	  This	  discussion	  most	  clearly	  impacts	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  creates	  these	  norms	  (who	  are	   the	   norm-­‐makers)	   because	   even	   if	   these	   norms	   are	   understood	   to	   arise	   in	  societies	  generally,	  if	  we	  assert	  that	  they	  are	  distinct	  from	  natural	  law,	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  the	  existence	  of	  norm-­‐makers	  and	  engage	  in	  discourse	  identifying	  norm-­‐makers	  and	  characterising	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  process	  of	  norm	  creation.	  	  Second,	  the	  extent	  of	  engagement	  of	  jurisdictions	  also	  affects	  the	  content	  of	   the	   norms.	   We	   must	   accept	   some	   of	   the	   critiques	   of	   legal	   and	   cultural	  relativism,	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  some	  norms	  and	  concepts	  are	  shaped	   by	   the	   legal	   and	   cultural	   space	   from	  which	   the	   norms	   emanate	   and	   to	  
                                                            
58   Waldron, above n 1, 200. 
59  See John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’ (2012) 1 CJICL 20, 23. 
which	   they	   apply.60	   Accordingly,	   the	   exclusion	   or	  marginalization	   of	   particular	  states	  within	  transnational	  discourse	  means	  that	   the	  perspectives	  of	   their	   legal	  and	  social	  frameworks	  will	  also	  have	  little	  or	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  developing	  norms.	  Conversely,	   the	   frameworks	   of	   states	   that	   are	   actively	   engaged	   will	   be	   more	  heavily	  reflected	  in	  the	  norms	  identified	  in	  the	  cosmopolitan	  arena.	  The	  result	  is	  not	  that	  we	  should	  accept	  legal	  and	  cultural	  relativism	  wholeheartedly,	  but	  that	  we	  should	  seek	  to	  recognize	  some	  truth	  in	  relativist	  critiques	  of	  comparativism	  and	  cosmopolitanism.	  	  This	  calls	  for	  a	  heightened	  self-­‐awareness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  engaged	  in	  comparative	   analysis.	   From	   the	   postmodernist	   perspective,	   the	   comparative	  exercise	   is	   critiqued	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   comparatists	   (whether	   practitioners	   or	  academics)	   approach	   their	   work	   from	   their	   own	   cultural	   frameworks.	  Postmodernists	  maintain	   that	   the	   comparatist’s	   cultural	   framework	   affects	   the	  epistemological	   choices,	   functional	   analysis	   and	   normative	   reasoning	   of	  comparative	   work.	   The	   impact	   of	   framework	   bias	   means	   that	   the	   dominant	  cultural	   framework	   is	   exalted	   in	   comparative	   studies	   and	   there	   is	   an	   iterative	  process	  of	  exclusion	  of	  ‘the	  other’	  culture(s).	  This	  sort	  of	  critique	  is	  familiar	  and,	  indeed,	   understandable	   where	   multiple	   jurisdictions	   interact	   within	   a	  transnational	  or	   global	   setting.	  Thus,	   as	   international	   law	  has	  been	  assailed	  by	  complaints	  of	  eurocentricity	  and	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  global	  north	  and	  south,	  comparative	   law	  has	  been	  subjected	   to	  similar	  critique.61	   Indeed,	   the	  empirical	  data	   presented	   above	   demonstrates	   that	   some	   of	   this	   critique	   is	   justifiable,	   as	  there	  is	  an	  imbalance	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  global	  north	  and	  west	  and	  marginalization	  of	  the	  global	  south	  and	  east.	  The	  comparatist,	  must,	  in	  response,	  cultivate	  a	  high	  level	  of	  consciousness	  of	  her	  cultural	  influences,	  her	  methodological	  choices	  and	  the	   relationship	   between	   her	   research	   and	   the	   dominant	   political	   and	   cultural	  climate.62	  In	  short,	  the	  comparatist	  must	  be	  self-­‐aware	  and	  acknowledge	  her	  own	  cultural	  framework.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  she	  advances	  claims	  of	  universalism	  while	  brushing	   aside	   concerns	   of	   hermetic	   and	   imbalanced	   engagement,	   she	   is	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signalling	  that	  for	  her,	  the	  ‘legal	  world’	  is	  represented	  by	  those	  jurisdictions	  that	  fit	  within	  her	  own	  cultural	  framework.	  	  This	   self-­‐critical	   approach	   is	   all	   the	   more	   important	   where	   there	   are	  cosmopolitan	   or	   universalist	   goals	   within	   the	   comparatist’s	   work.	   Such	   goals	  broaden	   the	   field	   of	   study	   and	   simply	   make	   it	   harder	   to	   achieve	   accurate	  conclusions,	   and	   a	   cosmopolitan	   or	   universalist	   outlook	   heightens	   the	  probability	   of	  dominant	  of	   the	  discourse	  by	   the	  prevailing	   cultural	   framework.	  The	   ius	   gentium	   theory,	   as	   presented	   by	  Waldron,	   fails	   to	   be	   sufficiently	   self-­‐conscious	   and	   self-­‐critical.	   The	   current	   defence	   of	   the	   theory	   misses	   the	  opportunity	   to	   acknowledge,	   interrogate	   and	   account	   for	   the	   imbalances	   in	  comparative	  engagement.	  	  Third,	  we	  should	  also	  question	  whether	  the	  engagement	  factor	  affects	  the	  objects	   of	   the	   norms,	   that	   is,	   to	   whom	   they	   should	   apply.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   equal	  engagement	   in	   the	   norm-­‐making	   process,	   then	   arguably	   the	   norms	   are	   not	  accurately	   characterized	   as	   part	   of	   a	   ius	   gentium	   either	   in	   their	   creation	   or	   in	  their	  application.	  Now,	  it	  might	  be	  claimed	  by	  defenders	  of	  Waldron’s	  theory	  that	  the	   ius	  gentium	  does	  not	  perceive	   jurisdictions	  as	  constituents;	   that	   individuals	  are	  the	  true	  constituents,	  and	  that	  the	  concerns	  regarding	  state	  engagement	  are	  misplaced	   or	   overblown.	   This	   rejoinder,	   is	   however,	   unconvincing.	   While	  individuals	  may	  be	  the	  constituents	  of	  a	  ius	  gentium,	  in	  the	  current	  framework	  it	  is	  state	   institutions	  that	  represent,	  speak	  for,	  and	  create	  norms	  for,	   individuals.	  Indeed,	   institutional	   context	   is	   a	   crucial	   element	   in	   constructing	   an	   account	   of	  transnational	   law,	   even	   a	   cosmopolitan	   account	   of	   transnational	   law.63	   It	   is	  through	   legal	   and	   political	   institutions	   that	   individuals	   participate	   in	   the	  cosmopolitan	  space	  envisioned	  by	  the	  ius	  gentium	  theory.	  	  These	   are	   all	   salient	   questions	  which	   ought	   to	   affect	   our	   assessment	   of	  whether	   nations	   are	   engaged	   in	   reciprocal	   or	   true	   dialogue.	   The	   imbalances	  discussed	  above	  undercut	  the	  commonality	  of	  the	  norms	  that	  would	  form	  part	  of	  the	   ius	  gentium	   and	  undermine	   the	  claim	  that	   the	  enterprise	   is	   truly	  global.	  To	  sustain	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  global	  enterprise	  and	  the	  ius	  gentium,	  these	  issues	  must	  be	  confronted	  in	  detail.	  Moreover,	  assuming	  the	  usefulness	  of	  citing	  foreign	  law,	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particularly	   as	   a	   technique	   to	   improve	   the	   accuracy	   and	   fairness	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   imbalanced	   judicial	   discourse	   adversely	   affects	   the	   benefits	   of	   judicial	  comparativism	   as	   it	   diminishes	   the	   perspectives	   that	   inform	   judicial	   decision-­‐making.	   If	  one	   function	  of	   comparativism	   is	   to	  enable	  courts	   to	   treat	   like	  cases	  alike,	   imbalanced	  engagement	  severely	  undermines	  this	  objective,	  as	   it	  distorts	  the	  pool	  of	  ‘like	  cases’.	  	  One	  proposal	   for	  addressing	  these	   issues	   is	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  while	  a	  
ius	   gentium	   is	   in	   the	   process	   development,	   it	   has	   not	   yet	   emerged	   as	   a	   fully	  fledged	   system	   of	   law.	   This	   proposal	   would	   address	   criticisms	   regarding	   the	  compartmentalized	   and	   imbalanced	   nature	   of	   current	   transnational	   judicial	  discourse.	  It	  is	  recognition	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  ‘much	  of	  the	  transnationalisation	  of	  law	   and	   legal	   relations	   is	   taking	   place	   at	   sub-­‐global	   levels.’64	   This	   approach	  maintains	  the	  overall	  theme	  of	  moving	  beyond	  the	  state	  but	  is	  more	  realistic	  in	  its	   description	   of	   the	   current	   models	   of	   transnational	   dialogue.	   Moreover,	  describing	  the	  ius	  gentium	  as	  emerging	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  more	  modest	  than	  Waldron’s	  theory,	  but	  does	  not	  foreclose	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  ius	  gentium	  as	  described	  by	  Waldron	  may	  one	  day	  exist.	  It	  admits	  of	  this	  possibility	  and	  even	  encourages	   it,	   by	   urging	   a	  more	   self-­‐aware	   and	   culturally	   sensitive	   process	   of	  comparative	  reasoning	  and	  comparative	  scholarship.	  	  
Principles	  	  A	  further	  issue	  relating	  to	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  ius	  gentium	  theory	  is	  the	  dilution	   of	   principles	   operating	   in	   a	   cosmopolitan	   space.	   Principles	   tend	   to	   be	  capable	   of	   flexible	   application	   since	   they	   ‘do	   not	   operate	   in	   an	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  fashion’	  and	  can	  be	  applied	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  weight.65	  It	  is	  partly	  the	  level	  of	  generality	  of	  principles	  that	  makes	  them	  particularly	  attractive	  in	  comparative	  judicial	  exchanges.	  The	  universalistic	  nature	  of	  constitutional	  principles	  such	  as,	  for	   instance,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   separation	   of	   powers	   at	   a	   high	   level	   of	  abstraction	   means	   that	   their	   invocation	   does	   not,	   ipso	   facto,	   threaten	   the	  commitment	  to	  the	  particular	  values	  and	  local	  conditions	  of	  the	  state	  in	  question.	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However,	  courts	  use	  foreign	  citations	  relating	  to	  principles	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  depending	   on	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   judges	   in	   the	   case,	   the	   textual	  arrangements	   of	   the	   constitution,	   and	   the	   social	   and	  political	   circumstances	   of	  the	   society.	   This	   may	   include	   a	   decision	   by	   the	   court	   to	   reject	   a	   particular	  understanding	   of	   the	   principle	   as	   articulated	   by	   another	   jurisdiction.	   For	  example,	  in	  R	  v	  Kirby,	  ex	  p	  Boilermakers’	  Society	  of	  Australia	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	   referred	   to	   US	   law	   on	   the	   requisite	   separation	   of	   powers	   between	   state	  institutions,	   but	   indicated	   that	   the	   division	   in	   the	   Australian	   constitution	   ‘is	   a	  division	   of	   powers	   whose	   character	   is	   determined	   according	   to	   traditional	  British	  conceptions’.66	  For	  the	  High	  Court,	  articulating	  this	  division	  ‘according	  to	  traditional	  British	  conceptions’	  meant	  that,	  while	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  separation	  of	   powers	   principle	   in	   the	   US	   required	   separation	   of	   the	   executive	   and	   the	  legislature,	   in	  Australia	   ‘difficulties	  as	  between	  executive	  and	   legislative	  power	  are	  not	  to	  be	  expected.’67	  	  The	  argument	  from	  abstraction	  and	  vagueness	  is	  a	  familiar	  critique	  of	  the	  articulation	  of	  principles	  as	  norms	  and	  the	  use	  of	  principles	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.68	   Thus,	   for	   instance,	   Raz	   objects	   that	   ‘[p]rinciples,	   because	   they	  prescribe	  highly	  unspecific	  acts,	  tend	  to	  be	  vaguer	  and	  less	  certain	  than	  rules.’69	  Larry	   Alexander	   is	   similarly	   unconvinced	   by	   the	  model	   of	   principled	   decision-­‐making,	  arguing	  that	   legal	  principles	  combine	  the	  worst	   features	  of	  pure	  moral	  reasoning	   and	   decision-­‐making	   by	   precedent	   rules.	   In	   Alexander’s	   account,	   if	  legal	   principles	   are	   not	   moral	   principles,	   the	   court	   cannot	   disregard	   all	   past	  decisions	  that	  it	  deems	  morally	  wrong,	  as	  that	  would	  undermine	  the	  coherence	  within	   the	   legal	   system.	   Yet,	   despite	   these	   constraints,	   legal	   principles	   do	   not	  possess	   the	   ‘compensating	   settlement	   value	   of	   decision-­‐making	   according	   to	  rules’	  because	  principles	  ‘tend	  to	  be	  more	  vague	  and	  more	  dependent	  on	  value-­‐laden	   terms	   than	   posited	   rules	   that	   prescribe	   results	   for	   future	   cases’	   and	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because	   the	   process	   by	   which	   competing	   principles	   should	   be	   weighed	   is	  elusive.70	  	  	  These	  critiques	  are	  heightened	  when	  the	  principles	  have	  to	  be	  diluted	  in	  order	  to	  be	  relevant	   in	  a	  cosmopolitan	  arena.	  When	  principles	  are	  proposed	  as	  part	   of	   the	   ius	   gentium,	   they	   exist	   at	   such	   a	   high	   level	   of	   abstraction	   that	   this	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  accurate	  or	  meaningful	  to	  characterize	  them	  as	  norms.	  The	  point	  here	  might	  not	  be	  so	  much	  to	  reject	  these	  principles	  in	  toto;	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  or	  a	  doctrine	  of	  necessity,	  or	  a	  requirement	  for	  separate	  or	  divided	  powers,	  for	  instance,	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  norms.	  The	  principles	  might	  exist	  as	  norms	  within	  national	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  but	  when	  they	  are	  transposed	  to	  the	   transnational	   level,	   they	   become	   so	   general	   that	   they	   lose	   the	   quality	   of	  norms.	   It	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   ius	   gentium	   theory	   that	   the	   body	   of	   principles	   that	  connect	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  world	  are	  not	  natural	  law,	  but	  global	  legal	  norms.	  The	  difficulty	   is	   that	   the	   attempt	   to	   present	   these	   principles	   as	   global	   or	   universal	  makes	   them	  particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   critique	   that	   they	   are	  nothing	  more	  than	  expressions	  of	  morality	  or	  expressions	  of	  natural	  law.71	  	  A	   proposal	   for	   responding	   to	   the	   generality	   problem	   is	   that	   we	   should	  redirect	  our	  focus	  from	  trying	  to	  identify	  these	  principles	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ius	  gentium	  and	  instead	  identify	  cosmopolitan	  methodologies	  for	  legal	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  reframing	  would	  address	  the	  critique	  regarding	  the	  dilution	  of	  the	  principles	  as	  norms.	   It	   would	   engage	  with	   the	   ongoing	   conversation	   about	   convergences	   in	  techniques	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  such	  as	  discourse	  about	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  concepts	  such	  as	  proportionality,	  the	  growth	  in	  citations	  of	  foreign	  law	  and	  the	  use	   of	   principles	   in	   arguments	   and	   legal	   reasoning.	   Such	   trends	   in	   decision-­‐making	  techniques	  traverse	  many	  borders	  and	  they	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  modest	  claim	  regarding	  the	  similarities	   in	  devices	  and	  frameworks	   for	   legal	  decision-­‐making,	  rather	   than	  a	   claim	  regarding	   the	   content	  of	   substantive	  norms.	   It	   changes	   the	  conversation	  from	  one	  about	  content	  of	  principles	  to	  the	  role	  that	  principles	  and	  other	  decisional	  devices	  play	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.	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E. Conclusion	  	  The	   concept	   of	   need	   is	   a	   central	   aspect	   of	   the	   above	   discussion	   of	   the	  cosmopolitan	   account	   of	   the	   transnational	   judicial	   use	   of	   constitutional	  principles.	   Societies	   need	   order,	   and	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   revolutions	   or	   other	  departures	   from	   regular	   democratic	   constitutional	   processes,	   there	   remains	   a	  need	   for	   laws	   to	   forestall	   a	   legal	   vacuum.	   Need	   also	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	  explanation	   of	   the	   proliferation	   of	   norms	   that	   transcend	   national	   boundaries.	  One	   commentator	   notes	   that	   as	   we	   engage	   in	   more	   trade,	   transactions	   and	  communications	   across	   national	   and	   continental	   boundaries,	   ‘we	   have	   more	  need	  for	  law	  that	  transcends	  national	  and	  cultural	  borders	  along	  with	  us.	  And	  as	  the	  great	  challenges	  of	  our	  age	  …	  have	  become	  global,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  become	  global	  ourselves	  and	  develop	  a	  legal	  framework	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  address	  these	  problems	   in	   an	   adequate	   way.’72	   Thus,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   global	   law,	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  ‘point	  of	  convergence’	  for	  legal	  systems.	  It	  is	  partly	  this	  need	  that	  cosmopolitanism	  in	  general	  and	  Waldron’s	  thesis	  regarding	  the	  ius	  gentium,	  in	  particular,	  seek	  to	  satisfy.	  However,	  this	  paper	  has	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  while	  there	   is	   some	   convergence	   on	   central,	   core	   applications	   of	   constitutional	  principles	   relating	   to	   basic	   needs,	   there	   are	   complexities	   arising	   from	   history,	  legal	  traditions	  and	  geopolitical	  dynamics	  that	  affect	  the	  process	  of	  transnational	  engagement,	  and	  the	  content	  of	  the	  principles	  that	  form	  part	  of	  the	  ius	  gentium.	  	  What	   emerges	   is	   that	   advancing	   a	   theory	   of	   ius	   gentium	   using	  (constitutional)	  principles	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  magnifying	  the	  Achilles’	  heels	  of	  both	  comparative	   law	   and	   reasoning	   by	   principles.	   With	   respect	   to	   reasoning	   by	  principles,	  the	  ius	  gentium	  theory	  may	  serve	  to	  further	  highlight	  the	  abstract	  and	  vague	  nature	  of	  principles,	  fuelling	  the	  fire	  of	  sceptics	  who	  doubt	  the	  normative	  value	  of	  legal	  principles.	  The	  comparative	  enterprise	  is	  made	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  the	   post-­‐modernist	   critique	   that	   comparatists	   pursue	   an	   ‘agenda	   of	   sameness’	  while	  paying	  insufficient	  regard	  to	  the	  cultural	  frameworks	  of	  the	  lawmakers	  of	  the	  various	   jurisdictions	  studied.73	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  damaging	   is	   that	   the	   ius	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gentium	   theory	   marginalizes	   justifiable	   critiques	   of	   the	   ethnocentricity	   of	   the	  comparatist.	  	  To	   respond	   to	   these	   critiques,	   it	   is	   critical	   to	   develop	   an	   approach	   that	  preserves	  the	  underlying	  usefulness	  of	  a	   ius	  gentium	   theory	  while	  adding	  more	  nuance	   to	   its	  description.	  Accordingly,	  we	   can	   reconceptualize	   the	   ius	  gentium,	  either	  by	  describing	  it	  as	  emerging	  but	  not	  current	  reality,	  or	  by	  reframing	  it	  as	  a	  system	  of	  converging	  methodologies	  but	  not	  substantive	  norms.	  
